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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Apparatchiki struggle to remain relevant in transition 
With the selection of Dmitri Medvedev as President Putin's heir apparent, the 
fluidity among the "clans" around the president likely will harden, as the losers in 
the succession battle grasp for footholds and seek allies in the impending 
Kremlin reorganization.  
 
While clear winners in the presidential succession, foremost among them 
President-Select Dmitri Medvedev and his campaign manager and Kremlin Chief 
of Staff, Anatoli Sobyanin, are easy to identify, it is the status of those left in the 
cold, whose positions are most difficult to discern.  In part, it is Putin's method, 
following the example set by Boris Yel'tsin, of transitioning former close 
associates into seemingly powerful positions, when in fact they are being ousted 
from a presidential inner circle, that serves to cloud the outline of the apparat 
hierarchy to all but the members of the elite themselves. 
 
In the early years of the Putin administration, certain distinct groups appeared in 
his inner circle.  First among them were the remnants of the Yel'tsin Family, most 
of whose proximity to Putin gradually eroded as the president brought more of his 
own advisers into the Kremlin.  A few stalwart members with significant Kremlin 
clout remain, notably Anatoli Chubais, Head of Russia's Unified Energy System 
(although, as his restructuring program for the organization draws to a close, he 
may move on to other, less politically, charged tasks).  Chubais has proven 
remarkably resilient in successive apparat shakeouts, but he currently does not 
seem to have the same authority in Putin's corridors of power that he once 
wielded.  His onetime support of a possible Mikhail Kasyanov presidency might 
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still be remembered and could be enough to cost him any residual political 
authority. 
 
Putin's famed St. Petersburg faction consistently has broken into subsets of 
liberal economists and siloviki.  In Putin's Russia, as in Yel'tsin's, liberal usually 
refers to "western" model economists, whose priorities include integration with 
European and other western financial and some political institutions, and a lack 
of concern with a "derzhava" foreign policy that zealously seeks to counter the 
US and to pursue Russian nationalist, often imperialist, ambitions across the 
territory of the former Soviet Union.  There have been some exceptions to the 
foreign policy caveat, most notably perhaps, President Putin's "liberal mentor," 
Anatoli Sobchak.  Most of the members of this group, and some of the St. 
Petersburg siloviki as well, claim a connection to Putin through Sobchak's 
mayoral offices.  Anatoli Chubais appears among the members of this group, as 
does the chosen presidential successor, Dmitri Medvedev, and Putin government 
perennials Aleksei Kudrin and German Gref, among others.  
 
The siloviki faction, once thought to be relatively monolithic, also has a heavy 
lode of St. Petersburgers.  Sergei Ivanov and Viktor Ivanov, as well as Igor 
Sechin and Viktor Cherkesov are all former Leningrad/St. Petersburg associates.   
While the siloviki faction seemed ascendant, certainly through most of 2007, it is 
clear that at a critical juncture Putin turned from his siloviki number two, Sergei 
Ivanov, to his "liberal" number two, Medvedev.  Whatever the nature of the 
turning point, it either caused or derived from a rift in the siloviki faction that 
jumped to the forefront of public attention with Kommersant's publication of Viktor 
Cherkesov's "Don't turn our warriors into merchants" article.  The fracturing of the 
siloviki faction has proven a superlatively significant event in Putin's succession.  
Without united opposition within the Kremlin to a Medvedev presidency, the 
course of Putin's chosen path of transition has been relatively smooth.  The 
question that looms between now and the elections (and possibly through the 
immediate aftermath) is whether or not the siloviki will unite to derail or weaken a 
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Medvedev presidency.  Their apparent defeat in the Putin succession struggle 
could become a unifying force.  However, the exchange of escalating corruption 
allegations among members of the faction certainly has enervated the clan as a 
whole; the question of their resilience and resurgence is still open.  
 
Some members of Putin's close associates have moved comfortably among the 
clans.  Dmitri Kozak, a St. Petersburger, lawyer by training, and member of 
Putin's inner circle, was Putin's primary reform proponent, notching extensive 
reforms of the judicial and administrative systems in earlier years of Putin's 
presidency.  (The scheme of Kozak's reforms may have been grand, but the 
implementation, as always, is another matter.)  Interestingly, Kozak is also a 
close associate of Dmitri Medvedev's.  (2) 
 
Medvedev's own associates, separate from or held in common with the current 
president, surely will filter into the Kremlin as Medvedev takes on the presidency 
(after the requisite election, of course).   As with every element of this transition, 
the Kremlin looms large:  Who will occupy the Kremlin itself?  Will Putin abandon 
the Kremlin and Novo Ogarevo for governmental digs?  Perhaps most 
importantly to the apparatchiki, how many members of the "Putin Family" will 
survive this transition with their Kremlin offices and authority intact…and for how 
long? 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Nel'zya dopustit’, chtoby prevratilis' v torgovtsev, by Viktor Cherkesov, 9 Oct 
07 via www.kommersant.ru, accessed October 10, 2007. 
(2) See Dmitry Medvedev: myth and reality on Vladimir Putin’s “heir,” 21 Dec 07, 
www.russia-intelligence.fr via www.russiaprofile,org. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Opposition denied run, threatened with detention 
Ending weeks of speculation, Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) 
announced on January 27 that former Prime Minister Mikhail Mikhailovich 
Kasyanov would be barred from running in the March 2 presidential election.  In 
2006, Kasyanov, founder and head of liberal opposition party the People’s 
Democratic Union (PDU), announced his intention to run for President of Russia 
in 2008. (1) Kasyanov became the PDU’s official candidate in December 2007, 
but due to the organization’s lack of representation in the State Duma, Kasyanov 
was required to submit a petition containing the signatures of at least two million 
supporters.   According to the CEC, an examination of the petition submitted on 
16 January allegedly “revealed” that 13.36 percent of the 2,067,000 signatures it 
contained were invalid.  Under Russian law, no more than five percent of 
signatures can be invalid on a petition in support of a candidate. (2) Commission 
secretary Nikolai Konkin claimed that “in this case, the number of valid signatures 
is less than 2 million, which provides grounds to refuse registration as a 
candidate. For this reason, Kasyanov should be excluded from participation as a 
candidate in the presidential election."  In addition, Kasyanov most likely will face 
a criminal investigation into his role in organizing the petition. (3) 
 
Allegations that the 80,261 signatures were counterfeit, along with what 
commission member Elvira Yermakova cited as “other flaws in Kasyanov’s 
documents submitted for registration” (4) first became public knowledge last 
week, and are further proof, according to Kasyanov, of the fact that “he is the 
target of a vast, pro-Kremlin conspiracy to undermine his goal of shaking up an 
authoritarian political system.” (5) In January 2000, Kasyanov became first 
deputy Prime Minister under President Vladimir Putin, who had just become 
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acting president in the wake of Boris Yel’tsin's resignation. After Putin won the 
May 2000 presidential election, he made Kasyanov his Prime Minister.  During 
Kasyanov’s tenure as Prime Minister, the country saw steady growth, a return to 
currency stability, and tax reform.  He is considered by some to be "the best 
prime minister in all of Russia's postwar history." (6)  
 
In February 2004, President Putin removed Kasyanov from office.  In the year 
following his dismissal, Kasyanov refrained from public comment on events such 
as the Beslan hostage crisis of September 2004 and the subsequent decision by 
Putin to end gubernatorial elections.  As Kasyanov stated later, Putin’s actions 
convinced him that “the main goal [of the current government] was to turn the 
country back to the past and to hold onto power."  Kasyanov spoke out publicly 
against the government at a press conference on the first anniversary of his 
dismissal, telling reporters to “look around … Just a few years ago, did anyone 
expect that there would be no independent media left in Russia?  That authorities 
would be fighting 'non-native inhabitants'?  That the main enemies would become 
Estonia and Georgia?  That political killings and wars between the secret 
services would become customary?" (7) and hinted for the first time at a 2008 
presidential bid.  Within a few months of his speech Kasyanov was under 
investigation by the Russian Office of Public Prosecutor over his activities while 
in office, an investigation that Kasyanov claimed was politically motivated. (8) 
 
In April 2006 Mikhail Kasyanov launched the People’s Democratic Union, which 
became one of the co-founders of The Other Russia, an umbrella coalition of 
opposition parties (9) in July 2006.  Over the next year, The Other Russia 
organized a series of protests throughout the country, some of which were 
dispersed violently by police. Kasyanov left the coalition in July after a dispute 
over how to select a single opposition presidential candidate. (10) 
 
In keeping with his political track record, it is hardly surprising to note that 
Kasyanov himself viewed his chances of participating in the presidential election 
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with guarded optimism.  When he arrived at the headquarters of the Central 
Election Commission to submit the signatures and paperwork required for his 
presidential bid, Kasyanov told reporters present that although he did not foresee 
a “free or fair election,” his real goal was to “defend the ‘democratic’ institutions 
[he had] empowered during his time in government,” institutions that he feared 
were “being destroyed by this current regime.” (11) In an email sent to various 
press agencies after the CEC made its final decision regarding his campaign, 
Kasyanov similarly made it clear that he considered himself a victim of the state 
leadership, writing: “Undoubtedly, the decision not to register my candidacy, as 
well as all important political decisions emerging in the 'vertical' system, were 
made personally by Vladimir Putin,” and "The country has finally gone on the 
slippery slope to totalitarianism." (12) He added, "This system, like the U.S.S.R., 
does not allow any improvement from within or from without," and that "Despite 
its seeming durability it will inevitably collapse under the weight of its own vices 
and crimes." (13) Further, Kasyanov’s representatives announced shortly after 
the decision by the Central Elections Commission was handed down that they 
will not appeal to the Supreme Court.  Due to the difficulty of finding a “law-based 
solution” inside the “vertical system of authority,” (14) the campaign will not 
appeal to the courts.  Despite calling on the Russian people to boycott the 
election, Kasyanov ended his statement optimistically, noting that his current 
setback is not a real loss.  “In spite of all circumstances, we have won because 
we have held our honor and dignity, and we have done all we could in the current 
situation. Those who think our campaign is over are mistaken. Our campaign is 
just beginning. Everyone is free to make his contribution to the construction of a 
new Russia.” (15) 
 
The Central Election Commission’s decision not to let Mikhail Kasyanov’s name 
appear on the ballot is unlikely to have a serious impact on the final outcome of 
the race.  After all, with the latest opinion polls showing his support at just one 
percent, (16) Kasyanov had little chance of actually winning the election.  
However, the Central Election Commission’s decision may be indicative of a 
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larger and more serious trend: the Kremlin’s increasing inability to tolerate 
criticism or non-official influence. (17) 
 
This is reinforced by several of Kasyanov’s attributes.  First, Kasyanov would 
have been the only liberal running for the presidency and the only candidate 
running without the backing of an established party, despite the presence of the 
nominally “Democratic” Party leader, Andrei Bogdanov. Bogdanov who 
encountered meager opposition to entering the race, and his candidacy is 
considered by many to be a Kremlin creation aimed at fragmenting the 
opposition. (18) Second, Kasyanov’s years of experience, including time spent in 
Putin’s own administration, give his claims more weight than those of an outsider.  
This may have fueled fear that Kasyanov could have used his campaign as a 
platform from which to criticize President Putin and prospective President Dmitri 
Medvedev. (19) As Dmitry Oreshkin, an expert on political science in Moscow 
recently commented, “the current administration generally does not allow an 
alternative, it is afraid of debate, and not even because it could lose, but simply 
because it does not want to take part in it.” (20) In an effort to silence its critics, 
the Kremlin may have only underlined Kasyanov’s message.  
 
On a larger scale, the decision made by the current administration may 
complicate its relations with countries that believe Russia has lowered the level 
of democratic participation in the election, which, in turn, could weaken trust in 
the election’s outcome.  When the electoral procedure loses its value, it becomes 
more difficult for Russia to continue its claim to be a normal law-based and 
democratic state. (21) 
 
Nevertheless, the election continues.  With Kasyanov’s expulsion, it appears that 
the Central Elections Commission finally has decided on Russia’s presidential 
candidates, including Dmitry Medvedev, nominated by the United Russia party; 
Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party; Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Kremlin-
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sponsored, xenophobic Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR); and Andrei Bogdanov, 
of the nominally “Democratic” Party. (22) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Kasyanov not allowed to run for presidency,” Pravda, 24 Jan 08 via 
http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/24-01-2008/103628-
kasyanov_president_election-0. 
(2) “Kasyanov barred from Russian poll,” BBC News, 27 Jan 08 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7211622.stm. 
(3) David Nowak, “Little chance left of Kasyanov candidacy,” The Moscow Times, 
25 Jan 08 via http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2008/01/25/011.html. 
(4) Associated Press, “Russian authorities bar Kremlin critic from presidential 
election,” Associated Press, 27 Jan 08 via http://news.aol.com/story/_a/russian-
authorities-bar-kremlin-critic/n20080127042209990025. 
(5) Alexander Osipovich, “From insider to fighting the machine,” The Moscow 
Times, 23 Nov 2007 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/11/23/001.html. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) “Putin foe submits poll petition,” BBC News, 16 Jan 08 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7191418.stm. 
(9) “The Other Russia,” Wikipedia, via 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Other_Russia. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “Kasyanov says denial of registration politically motivated, doesn’t feel a 
loser,” Interfax, 27 Jan 08 via 
http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11953448. 
(13) Guy Faulconbridge, “Russia’s Kasyanov slams Kremlin for election ban,” 
Reuters, 27 Jan 08 via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2742825920080127. 
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(14) “Kasyanov will not appeal denial of registration – representative,” Interfax, 
27 Jan 08 via http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11953437. 
(15) Ibid. 
(16) Adrian Blomfield, “Putin bars candidate from presidential race,” Daily 
Telegraph, 25 Jan 08 via 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/01/25/wrussia125.x
ml. 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) “Expert dismisses Kasyanov as viable contender in presidential elections,” 
Interfax, 23 Jan 08 via http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/0.html?id_issue=11950964. 
(21) “Election will fall short of democratic standards without Kasyanov – rights 
activists,” Interfax, 27 Jan 08 via 
http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11953445. 
(22) “Medvedev, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Bogdanov entered on ballot papers,” 
Interfax, 27 Jan 08 via 
http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11953439. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Trepashkin as bait? 
Late in 2003, Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested in Moscow on suspicion of 
possessing an illegal, concealed firearm. A search of his apartment by law-
enforcement authorities supposedly yielded a cache of 30 classified documents, 
apparently leftover from his time as an FSB officer. As a result, Trepashkin was 
charged with treason, and transferred to the Matrosskaya Tishina prison, pending 
trial. Within weeks, Trepashkin had been convicted in a closed-door hearing, and 
sentenced to four years imprisonment at a “remote settlement.” 
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At the time of his arrest, Trepashkin was working as defense counsel for two 
Chechens accused of carrying out the 1999 apartment bombings that 
strengthened support for a renewed Russian offensive in Chechnya. Having 
served as lead investigator for a Duma inquiry into the bombings, Trepashkin 
planned to introduce evidence of FSB complicity in the bombings in an attempt to 
clear the defendants. (1) As such, his arrest clearly was politically motivated and 
designed to silence him. 
 
On 30 November 2007, Trepashkin was released from jail, having completed his 
sentence. Given the allegations against his former employers, his parole could 
be explained with two reasons. Either the authorities—given the “neutralization” 
of Alexandr Litvinenko—believe Trepashkin no longer represents a threat, or 
more worryingly, the FSB believes it would be better for Trepashkin to suffer an 
“accidental death” on the outside, rather than to die in prison. 
 
In the days following his release, Trepashkin spoke publicly a number of times, 
addressing both the Litvinenko assassination, and the 1999 bombings. In relation 
to the former, Trepashkin alleged that Litvinenko and his sponsor Boris 
Berezovsky were targeted by a dedicated hit squad and also stated that the 
bombings were carried out with (then Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin’s knowledge 
and were ordered by “somebody from his team.” (2) 
 
On 18 December, Trepashkin was interviewed by Gazeta.ru. During the 
conversation, Trepashkin made several new statements regarding the Litvinenko 
case. First, he claimed that he had warned Litvinenko that his life was in danger. 
Secondly, he alleged that the FSB also had targeted Yuri Felshtinsky, who co-
authored the book, “The FSB Is Blowing Up Russia,” with Litvinenko. Trepashkin 
stated that a team had been sent to Boston—where Felshtinsky resides—with 
orders to eliminate him. (3) For reasons unknown at this time, the hit on the 
author was never carried out.  Thirdly, Trepashkin stated that he would be 
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prepared to travel to Strasbourg, in order to present his evidence before the 
European Court of Human Rights in support of Litvinenko’s widow Marina. 
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—Trepashkin claimed that his information 
on Felshtinsky came “from the FSB,” through a “source that I can’t name.” (4) 
 
Trepashkin’s willingness to testify in Strasbourg is unlikely to concern the Kremlin 
deeply. But, the possibility that he has an active source within the FSB 
(presumably a disaffected individual with access) surely is causing consternation 
in the Lubyanka. It also reveals a third possible motivation behind his release: 
that the FSB’s hierarchy has discovered that there is a dissenter within its ranks, 
but needs Trepashkin out in the open as bait, in order to unmask the informant.  
 
If all of the above is correct, Trepashkin probably is now under 24 hour 
surveillance. And his safety is by no means guaranteed. His “usefulness” will be 
at an end once the “mole” is identified, and at that point, his life will be worth very 
little unless he takes action to protect himself. 
 
Borders: new special forces unit  
During the last two years, Russia’s Border Guard Service has undergone major 
reforms. In the spring of 2005, General Vladimir Pronichev, the Border Guard 
Service Chief, announced that R15 billion would be dedicated exclusively to the 
development of new facilities along Russia’s borders. Then, in the fall of 2005, 
General Victor Trufanov—Pronichev’s Deputy—announced that R6.2 billion out 
of the 2006 Budget would be earmarked for new border protection facilities. (5) 
Two vital aspects of the Border Reform Program were the reintroduction of 
Soviet-style “Closed zones,” (6) and the switch over from a conscript-based, to a 
fully professional—or contract—manpower policy. (7) All troops assigned to the 
service are to be fully professional as of January 1, 2009. (8) 
 
A major part of the construction project has been focused on Russia’s southern 
borders, firstly due to concern over the safety of Russia’s nuclear facilities and 
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immigration from Central Asia through Kazakhstan, (9) and secondly, due to 
concerns about the Caucasus frontier, particularly the border with Georgia, which 
now is alleged to represent “the main terror threat to the Russian Federation.” 
(10) 
 
Late in December 2007, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev met with President 
Vladimir Putin, in order to report on the Border Guards reforms. During the 
meeting, Patrushev informed the President that the operation to improve the 
Caucasus border infrastructure was complete. According to the FSB Chief, 88 
new facilities have been completed and put into operation. (11) 
 
The most interesting reform—and one not announced until December 2007—is 
the fact that a new, dedicated Special Forces unit has been raised from within 
the Border Guards’ Service. Such units—as yet officially unnamed—are to be 
issued with the best equipment and weapons, and are designed to be highly 
mobile and maneuverable. (12) According to Deputy Director Nikolai Rybalkin, 
these units will patrol the Russian-Kazakh and the Russian-Georgian borders, as 
well as the vulnerable eastern boundary with the People’s Republic of China. 
Further Special Forces teams are to be introduced in other sectors if necessary. 
(13) During the Soviet era, the Border Guards constituted one of the USSR’s 
most competent forces. If the move to a professional force, and the concurrent 
creation of a roving elite “troubleshooting” unit are successful, the Border Guards 
may again constitute Russia’s most capable military force outside of the GRU’s 
Spetsnaz. 
 
Update: row linked to Litvinenko 
In November 2007, British authorities made an apparent concession in the 
Litvinenko murder case. Instead of re-filing extradition charges for Andrei 
Lugovoi, Scotland Yard’s prime suspect, the Crown Prosecution Service asked 
Russian authorities to investigate the case themselves, so that evidence against 
Lugovoi could be secured. Yuri Chaika, the Prosecutor General, responded by 
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simply refusing to comply. Lugovoi meanwhile labeled the British request a 
provocation. (14) 
 
Late in December, Chaika spoke publicly about the matter, arguing that the 
“materials” handed over to Russian authorities by Scotland Yard “do not provide 
any proof of Lugovoi’s guilt.” Chaika insisted that more evidence should be 
handed over before any moves could be made. (15) British authorities since have 
stated that they will not publicize their evidence against Lugovoi. To do so, 
authorities maintain, would be unproductive: either Moscow would dismiss it out 
of hand, or it would be used to put Lugovoi on trial, and then “announce” his 
acquittal. Lugovoi would “not get a non-political trial.” (16) 
 
In mid-December, the Russian Foreign Ministry, headed by Sergei Lavrov, made 
an admittedly retaliatory move in response to the extradition requests. British 
Council Offices across Russia were ordered to suspend their activities as of 
January 2008. (17) Lavrov has played out a dual track argument, claiming that 
“the whole problem was created by our British colleagues,” who “put forward 
totally unrealistic demands for the extradition of Lugovoi,” while also arguing that 
the British Council is guilty of tax evasion. (18) Britain, so Lavrov stated, must 
“make the first move” to correct the situation. (19) 
 
The Russian Foreign Office’s order has led to an increased game of tit-for-tat 
between the UK and Russia. Tony Brenton, the British Ambassador in Moscow 
insisted that the British Council would continue its work, and that its closure 
would be “illegal” under a 1994 accord between the two nations. (20) For its part, 
Russia first suspended visa applications for the Council’s staff, and then 
launched an “explanatory investigation” by the FSB into Russian citizens working 
for the Council in order to “shield Russian citizens” from becoming involved in 
“prevocational”[sic]—read espionage—“games of the British.” (21) Finally, on 15 
January, the FSB stopped Stephen Kinnock (son of former Labor Party Leader 
Neil Kinnock), Director of the St. Petersburg office of the British Cultural Center, 
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on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Kinnock was held for an 
hour before being released to the British Consul General. (22)   
Whitehall’s response to Mr. Kinnock’s detention was to insist that the intimidation 
and harassment of British staff was “completely unacceptable,” and to summon 
Yuri Fedotov, the Russian ambassador in London, to the Foreign Office “for 
consultations”. (23) On 17 January, the British Council suspended its operations 
in Russia, because the “campaign of intimidation” vis-à-vis its staff posed a 
“significant risk” to their safety. 
 
Russian sources have reiterated that the escalating moves against Britain are 
related directly to the Litvinenko case. Aside from the above comments by Sergei 
Lavrov, a “diplomatic source” in Moscow claimed that the row could be settled 
immediately, if Britain cancelled its “unfriendly decisions” against Russia. While 
the unnamed source spoke directly only of Britain’s visa restrictions vis-à-vis 
Russian citizens, it is self-evident that the “unfriendly decisions” relate to other 
matters also. (24) 
 
Andrei Lugovoi obtained a Duma seat in December’s elections. As such, he has 
Parliamentary immunity, and Moscow will not budge on his extradition. To 
claim—as Russia has in the past—that his extradition is contingent upon a 
reciprocal hand-over of Boris Berezovsky is ludicrous. If Lugovoi were handed 
over, the incentive not to reveal all he knows would be lost. In fact, it would be in 
his interest to make a deal with the Crown Prosecution Service in return for his 
knowledge. In turn, Britain is highly unlikely to hand over Berezovsky. Russia’s 
position makes little sense—other than from the perspective of simply flexing its 
diplomatic muscle. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) The Moscow Times, 14 Jan 03 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(2) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV Number 6 (17 Dec 07) . 
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(3) “Former Agent Trepashkin Prepared To Testify Against FSB in European 
Court’s Litvinenko Case: Interview With Mikhail Trepashkin by Aleksandr 
Artemyev,” Gazeta.ru, 18 Dec 07; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(4) Ibid.  
(5) “Russia to Increase Border Financing Fourfold in 2006,” Krasnaya zvezda, 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 Sep 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Border Service Switches to Contracts” by Boris Dmitriyev, Voenno-
promyshlennyi kurier, No 49, 28 Dec 05 – 10 Jan 06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Russia Is Re-establishing Soviet Borders,” Kommersant, 2 Aug 06; What The 
Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) “Russian Border Guard Service To Complete Transfer to Contract Manning in 
2008,”  Interfax-AVN Website, 14 Jan 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “Russian Chief on Growing Extremism in Urals Federal District,” Interfax, 14 
Sep 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(10) “FSB Chief Inaugurates New Border Complex in Dagestan,” RGVK  TV, 
Makhachkala, in Russian, 14 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) “FSB Chief Reports State Border Infrastructure in North Caucasus 
Complete,” ITAR-TASS, 29 Dec 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(12) “Russia: Border Service Forming Special Forces Units.” Agentstvo 
Voyennykh Novostey, 21 Dec 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(13) Ibid.  
(14) “Litvinenko May Have Killed Himself, Says Russian Accused of His Murder,” 
The Times of London, 2 Nov 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) “Russian Prosecutor Says UK Documents Provide No Proof On Polonium 
Murder,” Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 25 Dec 07; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(16) “Why Britain Withholds Lugovoi Evidence,” BBC News, 16 Jan 08 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7192044.stm  
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(17) “Russia Orders British Council Closures,” BBC News, 26 Dec 07 via 
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/learningenglish/newsenglish/witn/2007/12/071226_
bc_moscow.shtml  
(18) “UK Has Inflicted ‘Systemic Damage’ On Relations, Says Russian Foreign 
Minister,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 25 Dec 07; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(19) Ibid. 
(20) “Fresh Cloud Cast Over UK-Russia Ties,” Financial Times, 15 Jan 08 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(21) “Russian Security Services Start ‘Explanatory Work’ Among British Council 
Staff,” Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 15 Jan 08; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(22) “UK Warns Russia As Police Hold Official,” Financial Times, 18 Jan 08 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(23) “British Unit Is Alleging Intimidation By Moscow; Culture Offices Shut in 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
Power projection 
Military might continues to be a key requirement for Great Power status.  
Therefore, in order to be a serious player on the international stage a state must 
possess not only sufficient military capability, it also must be able to project this 
capability beyond its borders.  There are few better ways to project military power 
than by dispatching a large naval task force to conduct live-fire exercises in the 
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political backyard of one’s rivals.  Even more effective is to include long-range, 
nuclear-capable strategic bombers and front-line strike fighter aircraft. 
 
The Kremlin sought to project Russian military might off the European coastline 
last week as a Russian naval task force began conducting maneuvers near the 
Iberian Peninsula.  The task force includes the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov 
and the guided missile cruiser Moskva. (1)  The Northern Fleet—led by the 
Kuznetsov—left Russia 5 December on a mission to “ensure Russia’s naval 
presence in key operational areas of the world’s oceans and establish conditions 
for secure Russian maritime navigation.” (2)  The Moskva, which is the flagship 
of the Black Sea Fleet, joined the task force on 18 January to participate in the 
exercise. (3)  This is the Russian Navy’s first large-scale exercise in the Atlantic 
in 15 years.  (4) 
 
Russia also sought to project air power during the exercise:  British and 
Norwegian Air Forces scrambled fighter jets on 22 January to shadow Russian 
long-range bombers headed toward the Bay of Biscay to test-fire nuclear-capable 
missiles. (5)  The Russian Navy confirmed that two TU-160 bombers (NATO 
reporting name “Blackjack”) conducted tactical missile launches off the Spanish 
and Portuguese coastlines, and that both countries had been informed in 
advance. (6)  According to Russian public relations sources, over 40 aircraft will 
participate in the final stages of the exercises scheduled to end on 1 February. 
(7)  In addition to the Blackjack bombers and their SU-33 fighter escorts from the 
Kuznetsov, TU-95 Bear and TU-22 Backfire strategic missile carriers (long-range 
bombers), MiG-31 Foxhound and Su-27 Flanker fighters, IL-78 refueling aircraft 
and A-50 reconnaissance aircraft will conduct exercises to enable pilots to 
“practice reconnaissance techniques and bombing naval groups of a hypothetical 
enemy, engage in training fights and conduct air patrols.” (8)  
 
Earlier in the exercise, the Moskva test-fired an SS-N-12 cruise missile. (9)  The 
SS-N-12 Sandbox is a liquid-propelled supersonic missile capable of carrying 
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either a 350 KT nuclear warhead or a 1000kg high explosive warhead. (10)  
According to a Russian Navy spokesman, the missile—which was last fired in 
2003—successfully engaged its target. (11) 
 
Another time-honored method to demonstrate military strength is a military 
parade.  The Soviets were masters of the full-scale military parade during the 
Cold War with tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, and ICBMs rolling through Red Square, 
row after row of uniformed Red Army soldiers marching by and aircraft screaming 
overhead.  Earlier this month, the Kremlin announced that it would resume this 
public display of military might on 9 May, celebrating the anniversary of VE-Day 
and the inauguration of the next Russian president.  (12)  More than 6,000 
servicemen are scheduled to be reviewed by Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov 
and by Commander of the Moscow Military District, Army Gen Vladimir Bakin. 
(13)  According to the Russian Defense Ministry, modern combat hardware, 
including the new TOPOL-M mobile ICBM will be highlighted. (14)  The last 
Soviet military parade on Red Square was held in November 1990.  VE-Day 
parades resumed in 1995, but have not included military equipment. (15) 
 
Meanwhile, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky once 
again reminded the world that Russia has a very capable nuclear arsenal.  
During remarks broadcast on state-run television, Baluyevsky said that Russia 
would use nuclear weapons in preventative strikes, if necessary, to protect itself 
and its allies. (16)  “We do not intend to attack anyone” Baluyevsky said, “but we 
consider it necessary for all our partners in the world community to understand … 
that to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, 
military force will be used, including preventatively, including with the use of 
nuclear weapons.” (17)  Baluyevsky’s remarks do not represent a shift in Russian 
policy, but they do serve as a reminder of its nuclear policy, which represents yet 
another means of projecting Russian military capability to the international 
community. 
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For all this posturing and projection of force, Russia still packs a relatively small 
military punch.  In order to put together a naval task force capable of carrying out 
the stated mission of “ensuring Russia’s naval presence in key operational areas 
of the world’s oceans,” (18) the Russian Navy had to cannibalize both the Black 
Sea and Northern fleets; the task force represents almost all of the sea-worthy 
ships currently in the Russian navy.  While the task force is showing the flag in 
the Atlantic, there is nothing left to show at home in the Barents and Norwegian 
Seas, where fishing disputes often occur. (19)  The Kuznetsov carries a very 
limited number of jets and no attack aircraft; it is incapable of projecting force on 
land in the style of a US aircraft carrier.  Also, the Kuznetsov reportedly will go in 
for lengthy repairs at the end of its current deployment. (20) 
 
Though the navy was the first casualty of the Soviet collapse, the strategic 
bomber fleet also is extremely old and in disrepair, and there are credible reports 
of grave problems in ground-based strategic forces, as well.  Resumption of 
strategic patrols last August has strained further the decrepit Bear and Blackjack 
bombers.  Stockpiles of spares to fix the TU-160 jet engines have been depleted 
and the Blackjacks may be grounded permanently in two or three months—their 
engines worn out and no spares available. (21)  And Russian defense analysts 
report that all is not well with ICBM and SLBM test launches.  Some Russian 
rocket specialists report that warheads from last year’s test launches “seriously 
deviated” from their intended targets. (22) 
 
In Russia all this matters little.  The naval war games, public displays and 
aggressive rhetoric undoubtedly are intended as another forceful reminder to 
NATO and the US that the Kremlin will not sit by idly while the West pursues 
policies Moscow sees as contrary to its interest:  Missile defense bases in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, NATO “encroachment,” European recognition of Kosovar 
independence.  The real audience, however, is internal.  Large-scale naval 
deployments, world-wide patrols by nuclear-capable bombers and public displays 
of modern military hardware remind Russians of the days when the world 
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cowered in the shadow of Soviet military strength.  As a nationalist leader who 
claims restoration of Russian military might as one of his great achievements, 
President Putin is demonstrating to his people that Russia once again appears 
capable of projecting its power. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Jeremy Weiss 
 
Putin pays visit to Bulgaria 
During his two day visit to Bulgaria, January 17-18, nominally to honor the 130th 
anniversary of the Russo-Turkish war, which secured Bulgaria’s independence, 
(1) Vladimir Putin stated that Bulgaria’s turn toward NATO should not preclude 
the development of close relations with Moscow, and that, “The most important 
thing for us is that Bulgaria does not pursue its interests at the expense of the 
security interests of other countries.” (2) 
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Putin’s visit included a heavy emphasis on developing close ties in the energy 
sector. Progress in this field took place on two fronts. The first included the 
signing of a contract worth nearly six billion dollars for the construction by 
Russian firms of a nuclear power plant in the northern Bulgarian town of Belene. 
Secondly, Russia signed a trilateral agreement with Bulgaria and Greece to pave 
the way for construction of an oil pipeline between Burgas and Alexandropoulos 
that will transport Russian oil from terminals in the Black Sea region to the 
Aegean Sea. (3) Putin’s companion on the trip, First Deputy Prime Minister and 
presumed successor to the Russian presidential office, Dmitri Medvedev, held 
private meetings regarding energy policy with the Bulgarian President and Prime 
Minister, (4) demonstrating Putin’s ongoing preparations for Medvedev to take 
over the office, following elections later this year. The centrality of energy 
concerns to Russia’s foreign policy was underscored by Russia’s acquisition of a 
controlling stake in Serbia’s government-controlled oil monopoly only days later 
on January 22, (5) as well as recent discussions between Gazprom and the 
Nigerian government concerning possible purchases of natural gas resources in 
the African nation. The mostly harmonious visit to Bulgaria did not pass without 
small but vocal protests against Putin. 
 
While in Bulgaria, President Putin did not restrict his focus solely to energy 
matters. The issue of Kosovo and its potential declaration of independence from 
Serbia predictably arose as a topic of conversation. Suggesting close relations 
between Putin and his hosts in Sofia, one of Putin’s foreign policy advisors, 
Sergei Prikhodko, singled out Bulgaria’s stance on the Kosovo issue as worthy of 
praise, noting that although Bulgaria adheres to the EU’s position in favor of 
Kosovar independence, it has a better understanding of the Serb position than 
other European states. (6) Although Bulgaria maintains nominal support for 
Kosovar independence, Prikhodko’s focus on Bulgaria’s “moderate” stance 
toward the situation in Kosovo suggests that the Kremlin is seeking to improve its 
relations with Sofia by accentuating what positive aspects of Bulgarian policy it 
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can find. Moreover, the recent attention given to Bulgaria indicates that former 
Soviet satellite states remain in the focus of Russian foreign policy. 
 
Russia and the west continue row over Kosovo  
Russia’s dispute with the west over Kosovar independence was emphasized by 
Putin during his stay in the Balkans: “Our position in this respect is utterly clear: 
any decision on Kosovo must be approved by both sides.” (7) This position was 
echoed days later by Senator Mikhail Margelov, head of the Federation Council’s 
foreign affairs committee. (8) During a press conference the same day, the 
Russian President went a step further: “A unilateral declaration of independence 
by Kosovo would be illegal and immoral and Russia cannot support such a 
solution to the problem,” (9) and also indicated that any resolution of the Kosovo 
issue “will set a precedent in international practice.” (10) While Putin did not 
elaborate on his remark about “precedent,” it is evident that he was referring to 
the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose attempts 
to break from Georgian rule have Russian support. In reference to these other 
volatile areas, Russian Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grigori Karassin, 
emphasized this point: “If we come to the conclusion that in the current 
international situation, the right to self-determination is more important than 
territorial unity, then it would have to be applied to all regions of the world and not 
only those in which it pleases our partners.” (11) Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
however, then tried to play down this angle, characterizing any claims that 
Russia had threatened to destabilize the Caucasus in response to a declaration 
of independence by Kosovo as, “absolutely false.” (12) Nonetheless, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry signaled that any resolution of the Kosovo situation could cause 
ripples beyond the Balkans. 
 
Leaving the Caucasus aside, Lavrov returned to the issue of Kosovo in remarks 
that were anything but cryptic. Assailing the US and EU’s stance in favor of 
Kosovar independence, he stated, “We must do the utmost to solve [the issue] 
within the framework of international law and the non-violation of borders… 
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Anything else is illegal and cannot be recognized.” (13) Lavrov used the Kosovo 
matter as a launching pad for a wider attack on the European Union, saying “a 
reorganization of the entire European architecture” would be prominent among 
Russia’s foreign policy aims in the new year. (14) Russia recently made a 
provocative move in the debate over Kosovo by warning Pristina that Kosovo 
would never be allowed to join the United Nations or other international 
institutions in which Russia has a significant voice, drawing reactions from the 
US and UK in the form of statements affirming their commitment to Kosovar 
independence. (15) Although these threats may have little impact on the eventual 
resolution of the Kosovo issue, such maneuvering raises the stakes in the 
already intense Kosovo debate.  
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Putin introduces Medvedev and South Stream 
Russia is forging ahead with strategic deals to inject the South Stream pipeline 
into Western Europe, while Dmitry Medvedev makes his debut as the face of the 
future petro-behemoth. 
 
It might have been Natasha’s first ball drawn from the imagination of Leo Tolstoy. 
At Dmitri Medvedev’s foreign debut as President Putin’s heir-apparent in Bulgaria 
this January the media clucked over the soft-spoken Russian candidate, noting 
with approval his combination of youth and command over high-powered 
negotiations and charmed by his bashful reserve in the public spotlight. At a 
signing ceremony marking the conclusion of a deal that will bring Bulgaria online 
to the South Stream pipeline project, scheduled to come online in 2013, 
Medvedev was spotted sidling up to Putin. Both men grinned. Medvedev 
blushed, visibly. (1) 
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The blushing debutant was in Sofia to conduct negotiations as part of his job with 
Gazprom, the Russian energy giant where he is Chairman of the Board. He also 
was there, as noted, to be introduced into foreign affairs as Putin’s successor to 
the Russian presidency. The event, and in particular, Medvedev’s role in 
hammering out terms by which Gazprom will hold a 50 percent stake in pipelines 
on Bulgarian territory, raised the question as to whether Medvedev has any 
intention of retiring from Gazprom when he assumes the role of president in 
March. But then, in the sphere of foreign policy at least, the two jobs are not 
altogether distinct from one another. 
 
Medvedev’s participation in negotiations to build South Stream underlines the 
dual role of power in Russia—in the energy industry and in the halls of 
government. The power that Gazprom holds represents both sides of the same 
coin, a coin that has currency in Western Europe, as recent deals with Italy, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria and Serbia have shown. Those deals are expected to 
increase Russian influence over energy supplies with the completion of the South 
Stream pipeline, which is being built by Gazprom and Italy’s Eni. After crossing 
the Black Sea to Bulgaria, the pipeline will split into two branches—one running 
northwest through Hungary to Austria, and the other south to Greece and then 
west to southern Italy. (2) 
 
It is fitting that the future president was on hand to launch Russian energy policy 
into the next era. In addition to the South Stream accords, a series of 
developments set in motion this January will assure Russia a dominant position 
in the European energy market for the foreseeable future.  Austrian crude oil and 
natural gas company OMV AG signed an agreement with Gazprom to jointly 
develop Baumgarten, a central European gas trading hub, said by industry 
experts to be continental Europe's most important trading platform. (3) Although 
skeptics among European parliamentarians remain wary of a Russian monopoly, 
the governments themselves remain deadlocked over alternatives to the Russian 
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supply line. Indeed, since Russia began pressing forward with South Stream, 
European nations have been scrambling for a share of the pipeline. 
 
“We don't have to convince anybody,” Putin said when asked whether he had 
European support to go ahead with South Stream. “They ask us for [gas] every 
day, especially during the fall and winter.” (4) 
 
Putin is correct in his assertion that Europe has no viable means of procuring 
energy in the near future, apart from Russian downstream supply lines. At 
present, Gazprom supplies a quarter of European gas volumes (5), a share that 
is expected to double with the creation of the Baumgarten trading hub. (6) The 
hub will be fed by a branch off the South Stream pipeline, which will transport up 
to 31 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Siberian and Central Asian fields 
upstream. (7) 
 
Tracing the pipeline upstream, each stage marks a foreign policy coup for 
Gazprom and for Russia: Gazprom and OMV each have a 50 percent stake in 
Baumgarten; Hungary and Bulgaria both will be given 50 percent ownership over 
the pipeline passing through their territories, an arrangement that Bulgarian 
Economy Minister Petar Dimitrov touted with evident satisfaction. “In no other 
agreement signed by Gazprom have such favorable conditions been agreed,” he 
assured the Bulgarian press, (8) a claim that was not altogether accurate, 
considering that Serbia likewise has been granted a 50 percent share in the 
pipeline. That accord was sealed after the Serbian cabinet agreed to sell 
Gazprom a 51 percent stake in the state-owned Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) for 
$600 million, a price tag that represents just one-fifth of the Serbian company’s 
market value. (9) 
 
Italy, meanwhile, has been a partner in the project from its inception in November 
2006, when Eni and Gazprom signed an agreement to expand Russia’s gas 
transport network into the European Union. (10) In its capacity as partner, Italy 
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enjoys a privileged position in South Stream’s operation, including a plum share 
in upstream production granted to Eni in April 2007, when the last of Yukos’ 
assets, Siberian gas-producing companies ArcticGaz and Urengoil, were 
auctioned off by the Russian government. (11) Gas from those Siberian facilities 
will make up a portion of the volume that will be routed to Italy through the South 
Stream pipeline. 
 
In their eagerness to participate in the new energy network, the countries along 
South Stream’s overland route have signed on as minority shareholders in the 
project. For Gazprom, this is a brilliant solution to the “Ukrainian problem,” as 
transit deals are explicitly ruled out (12), in favor of an efficient system of bi-
lateral agreements. Each country is responsible for moving gas across its 
territory, an arrangement that effectively strengthens Russia’s leverage with 
transit counties. This flexibility will allow the Kremlin to act as the central 
manager of Europe’s energy supply system in the medium term. 
 
Certainly, for Medvedev it was an auspicious debut. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
New term, new cabinet, “new” Saakashvili? 
With his mandate reduced to almost half his support during his first term (when 
he garnered 96% of the vote), Saakashvili has received a powerful call from his 
electorate to take a different tack during his next term in office. With his first term 
cut short by protests from a “united” opposition of ten disparate political parties 
(reduced to nine following the Labor Party’s decision to back Shalva Natelashvili 
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as its presidential candidate), Saakashvili will have to demonstrate convincingly 
that he is responding to the concerns voiced during both the protests and the 
campaign season. 
 
The official results of the 5 January election, announced on 13 January, were as 
follows: National Movement incumbent candidate Mikheil Saakashvili, 53.47%; 
the National Opposition Council (the official name of the 9-party opposition) 
candidate Levan Gachechiladze, 25.69%; oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili, 7.1%; 
Labor Party candidate Shalva Natelashvili, 6.49%; New Rights leader David 
Gamkrelidze, 4.02%; economist Georgy Maisashvili, 0.77%; and Imedi party 
candidate Irina Sarishvili, 0.16%. (1) 
 
Most of the exit polls and parallel vote tabulations (PVTs) conducted during the 
elections predicted results similar to those given by official sources. Four of 
Georgia’s largest television stations—Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), 
Rustavi 2 TV, Mze TV and Adjara TV—sponsored an exit poll which was 
administered by the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA), Ilia 
Chavchavadze State University, the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy 
and Development (CIPDD), headed by Ghia Nodia, and the Georgian Foundation 
for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), under the leadership of 
Alexander Rondeli. The poll showed Saakashvili ahead with 56.2% of the vote, 
followed by Gachechiladze (27%), Patarkatsishvili (5.9%), Natelashvili (5.2%), 
Gamkrelidze (3.5%), Maisashvili (1%), and Sarishvili (0.2%). (2) 
 
The results of a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) conducted in 394 districts (out of 
more than 3500) by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy 
(ISFED) showed Saakashvili winning with 50.8% of the vote and Gachechiladze 
second with 27.2%. None of the remaining candidates garnered more than 8% 
according to the PVT results: Patarkatsishvili (7.3%), Natelashvili (7%), 
Gamkrelidze (4.3%), Maisashvili (1%) and Sarishvili (0.2%). (3) A Ukrainian 
organization, All European Affair, published exit poll results, cited on Russian 
 31 
television, claiming that Gachechiladze had won 31% of the vote and Saakashvili 
24.4%, with Shalva Natelashvili coming in a close third at 20.3%. The 
organization is headed by Leonid Belousov, who declined to state who had 
commissioned the poll. (4) 
 
PVTs and exit polls were a powerful tool in the Rose Revolution because they 
provided evidence that was used to accuse Shevardnadze of committing 
massive electoral fraud. As might be expected, this has contributed to the 
politicization of the polls. In particular, the exit poll sponsored by the television 
stations (most of which, opposition groups contend, support Saakashvili) 
received considerable criticism from the opposition. However, there was no 
evidence to suggest that the exit poll had been tampered with or was conducted 
in a way that favored the incumbent.  
 
The leaders of the National Opposition Council responded to the official results 
by demanding a recount and staging protests. Georgian law mandates a run-off if 
no candidate wins 50% of the vote plus one additional ballot, and the opposition 
contended that Saakashvili had garnered less than the required amount. Their 
public demonstrations included a rally that drew a crowd of thousands 
immediately following Saakashvili’s 20 January inauguration and a smaller 
demonstration staged by the Party of People in front of the American embassy 
on 22 January. (5) Signs at the various protests declared, “OSCE backs rigged 
elections” and “U.S.A. supporter of dictatorship.” (6) The opposition fiercely 
criticized the US statement welcoming Saakashvili’s electoral victory. The 
opposition’s actions produced a brief spate of negotiations with Speaker of 
Parliament and Interim President Nino Burdjanadze, as well as talks with several 
foreign dignitaries, including US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza. Bryza responded to opposition 
criticism of US support for the elections by stating that, observers had seen 
“irregularities of concern, but there was no systematic attempt we saw to use 
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massive fraud to change the result of the election.” (7) He encouraged opposition 
leaders to focus their efforts on contesting the spring parliamentary elections. 
 
The 5 January vote also included a referendum on Georgia’s NATO aspirations 
and the possibility of holding new parliamentary elections in May. One of the 
opposition’s chief points of contention with Saakashvili’s administration had been 
the decision to hold parliamentary elections in the fall of 2008, rather than spring 
2008 as originally scheduled. In the referendum, 72.5% of the voters supported 
Georgia’s bid to join NATO, and 69.8% opted for new parliamentary elections this 
spring. The date for new elections has not yet been set. (8) 
 
Both the opposition protests and the overwhelming vote in favor of new 
parliamentary elections signal the need for Saakashvili to adopt a different 
strategy in his second term. Frequently heard complaints include a neglect of 
domestic Georgian issues in favor of diplomatic visits to foreign countries and the 
failure to resolve Russia’s embargo on Georgian wine. Saakashvili recently has 
made overtures to the Russian leadership, but whether this will produce results 
remains to be seen. 
 
Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze has assembled a new cabinet for Saakashvili’s 
second term. It includes seven new members of the cabinet, including some with 
little or no political experience. The ministers of finance, agriculture, energy, and 
defense have remained the same, in addition to the controversial Minister of the 
Interior Vano Merabishvili. Among those joining the cabinet are think tank 
members Ghia Nodia (head of CIPDD) as Education Minister and Temur 
Iakobishvili (executive vice president of GFSIS) as Minister for Reintegration, 
formerly known as the Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues. The decision to 
recast the Ministry for Conflict Resolution Issues as the State Ministry for 
Reintegration may signal a shift in tactics for the Saakashvili government. 
Iakobishvili was formerly a diplomat – his selection as minister may indicate a 
decision to rely on negotiation rather than force to rein in the separatist republics. 
 33 
Not surprisingly, de facto Abkhazian President Sergei Shamba took umbrage at 
the change, stating that his “government” would refuse to negotiate with any 
representatives of the new ministry. (9) 
 
The decisive vote for new parliamentary elections and the relative success of the 
opposition candidates demonstrate the desire of a significant portion of Georgia’s 
population for a viable opposition. Currently, Saakashvili’s National Movement 
party dominates parliament. Saakashvili stated in his inauguration speech that 
building Georgia’s economy and addressing poverty will be one of his primary 
goals. (10) Yet it is not the rural poor whom Saakashvili needs most to win over, 
but instead the electorate in Tbilisi, the center of the protests and a location of 
relative prosperity. Saakashvili fared poorly in the capital, with Gachechiladze 
emerging the winner in nearly every district. (11) 
 
Saakashvili’s administration has brought more stability to the capital in the last 
four years. The lights are on and its police force is noticeably less corrupt than 
under Shevardnadze. Yet it was also in the capital that protesters were 
teargassed and dispersed using rubber bullets. The memory of Saakashvili’s 
violent reaction to the protests on 7 November has strengthened his opponents. 
If he wishes his party to maintain its parliamentary stronghold, Saakashvili must 
win back Tbilisi. 
 
In the meantime, the nine-party opposition has presented the government with a 
memorandum of its demands, threatening to stage permanent protests beginning 
on 15 February if its conditions are not met. The demands include the resignation 
of the cabinet following the spring parliamentary elections; the reconfiguration of 
key media bodies, including the board of the Georgian Public Broadcasting 
Channel and the Georgian National Communications Commission; and equal 
involvement at every level of the electoral apparatus. (12) 
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Both the November protests and the current tactics of the opposition confirm one 
legacy of the Rose Revolution – protests are a major tool for attempting regime 
change in Georgia. Although the November protests failed to remove the 
incumbent from office, they did provoke a new election. For now, it seems that 
protests may be a more successful predictor of new elections in Georgia than 
constitutionally mandated terms. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Is new Kyrgyz government up to challenges ahead?  
Despite protests by the opposition over the December parliamentary elections, it 
seems as though the election results will stand, with President Kurmanbek 
Bakiev’s Ak Jol party enjoying a majority so overwhelming (71 of the 90 
parliamentary seats) (1) as to make the opposition’s role almost insignificant.  
Theoretically, this should eliminate all political obstacles from President Bakiev’s 
path and give him the freedom to address the country’s most pressing problems 
quickly and efficiently.  Unfortunately, the problems may be piling up faster than 
the president can suggest remedies for them.  All of Central Asia is facing an 
energy crisis, as the region is beset by the harshest winter it has experienced in 
decades, oil and natural gas supplies tighten and prices continue to rise, 
resulting in rolling power outages.  Uzbekistan, which supplies natural gas to 
parts of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan has cut back its exports, (2) 
further exacerbating an already increasingly dire situation. 
 
All of the Central Asian states continue to be economically hamstrung by the fact 
that, for the most part, the old, centralized and ever more dilapidated Soviet 
infrastructure is still in place, including the electricity grid, fuel pipelines, railroad 
lines, and waterways and irrigation networks.  Even the system of roads and 
highways is much the same as it was during Soviet times.  Had all of the Central 
Asian states maintained visa-free regimes for inter-regional trade and travel, the 
flaws of the Soviet transportation and highway system might cause fewer 
problems.  Unfortunately, at one time or another, all of the Central Asian 
governments have utilized trade restrictions, visa requirements, and border 
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closings in order to exert pressure on one another and protect themselves from 
various perceived threats.  Perhaps the most egregious of these sanctions is the 
Uzbek government’s use of landmines to guard its side of the Tajik and Kyrgyz 
borders.  While these types of trade restrictions have hindered interstate 
commerce and damaged relations between the countries, it is the energy crisis 
that could plunge all three Ferghana Valley states into a socio-economic abyss. 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in particular, rely heavily on electricity and natural gas 
supplies from Uzbekistan not only to heat family residences, but also to supply 
power to business and industrial sectors in certain provinces, especially those 
close to the Uzbek border.  As the cold weather has caused pipelines to freeze 
and gas pressure to drop, many areas of Uzbekistan also have suffered power 
cuts. (3) This, coupled with Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s outstanding debts for 
Uzbek gas supplies, has prompted the Uzbek government to reduce fuel exports 
to its neighbors, forcing many schools, hospitals and industries to shut their 
doors until power is restored.  Because the old Soviet infrastructure is still in 
place, neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan has a viable alternative for procuring fuel 
and electricity.  The Uzbek government already has increased the price of its gas 
exports to Kyrgyzstan by 43%, to US$145 per 1,000 cubic meter, although only 
30% of this increase is to be passed on to individual consumers. (4) 
 
As the effects of the fuel shortage widen and inflict further damage on his 
country’s economy, President Bakiev’s main suggestions for resolving the 
problem have been to urge parliament to speed up the privatization of state-
owned enterprises and “to introduce more boldly but in a well-thought-out 
manner new financial instruments,” such as government-issued long-term bonds 
for such projects as the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power 
stations.  The president’s strategy is to make domestic industry more efficient 
and therefore more attractive to foreign investment. (5)  While this is certainly a 
laudable goal, it is a long-term goal and is very unlikely to solve any of 
Kyrgyzstan’s current and most pressing problems, even if parliament is 
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acquiescent to all of Bakiev’s wishes.  Adding to the country’s problems is that 
fact that due to a drop in the water level at the Toktogul reservoir, in 2008 Kyrgyz 
exports of hydroelectric power to Uzbekistan will be reduced by 75%. During a 
press conference, Deputy Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources Minister Akylbek 
Tyumenbaev admitted that “With every year it gets harder for us. We cannot 
meet growing demand for energy from the population, housing sector, small and 
medium business.” Tyumenbaev also told journalists that electricity shortages will 
likely not abate until the construction of the Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power 
station is completed. (6) 
 
The figures on economic growth published by Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics 
Committee paint a rosy picture: GDP for 2007 rose by 8.2%, industrial growth 
increased by 7.3% and industrial production grew by 10.3%.  However, inflation 
also rose by 20.1% (7) and will no doubt climb even higher in coming months, 
prompting Bakiev to deliver a warning to parliament and urge MPs to take action.  
The president told MPs that further price hikes, aging infrastructure and a 
shortage of trained professionals were the most serious risks facing Kyrgyzstan’s 
economy, as well as the country’s dependence on the import of raw materials. (8)  
Bakiev’s determination to focus on economic issues seems genuine, thus far.  
On a recent trip to Moscow, his new prime minister, Igor Chudinov, made 
Kyrgyzstan’s energy woes his main focus, soliciting Russian investment for both 
the hydropower industry, as well as in the search for new domestic oil and gas 
resources.  Chudinov met with Aleksei Miller, chairman of the Gazprom’s board 
of directors, to discuss Gazprom’s involvement in prospecting for oil and gas 
fields, as well as in building a second natural gas main. (9) 
 
The Kyrgyz economy certainly is in dire need of further investment and of a total 
overhaul of its energy supply system, to say nothing of its industrial sector, 
however, the fact remains that no amount of foreign investment is likely to solve 
its present crisis, a crisis which appears to be dangerously close to spiraling out 
of control, as Kyrgyz citizens’ most basic needs are no longer being met.  Fuel, 
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food, and access to education and healthcare are the most basic of amenities 
that even a poorly functioning state is expected to provide for its population.  
After years of neglecting their populations’ needs and allowing their countries’ 
infrastructures to decay—in certain sectors, almost to the point of collapse—the 
Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek governments seem to have reached a point where they 
are no longer able to offer even the most essential services to their citizens.  If 
the energy crisis continues, these governments face the prospect of economic 
collapse, which may well provide the catalyst for widespread popular unrest. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s leadership war II 
In December 2007, as Yulia Tymoshenko took the helm of Ukraine’s government 
for the second time, the most often expressed concern of domestic political 
pundits was not how the new Prime Minister would deal with the country’s gas 
debt, high poverty level, corrupt judiciary, or final WTO preparations.  Instead, 
most feared that President Viktor Yushchenko would be unable to find a way to 
work with Tymoshenko, thereby dooming their renewed alliance and their reform 
agenda.    
 
This fear has proven justified, as President Yushchenko steadily has increased 
his “input” into the day-to-day functioning of the government, undercutting several 
ambitious initiatives and causing confusion within government circles about just 
who is in charge of what. 
 
Over the last eight years, the two have been allies, rivals and a little bit of both.  
Today, Tymoshenko’s personal popularity far outstrips Yushchenko’s, with the 
presidential election less than two years away.    Since Ukraine’s political system 
is confusing at best, duties and responsibilities of the President and Prime 
Minister often overlap, creating a dependence on power politics to assert ones 
primacy.  
 
In particular, during the last several weeks, Yushchenko slowed the 
government’s plan to privatize 26 government assets (or the government stakes 
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in those assets), including a group of regional energy distribution entities.    He 
also spoke out against Tymoshenko’s attempts to remove intermediary 
corporations from Ukraine’s gas agreements, in spite of his loud support for such 
efforts during the September parliamentary campaign, and he has rejected the 
Prime Minister’s calls to switch to “market-based” fees for transiting Russia’s gas 
to Europe. 
 
In most cases, Yushchenko’s opposition to Tymoshenko’s proposals seems to be 
based on a desire to blunt any political capital she may gain from their success, 
rather than on ideological or economic grounds.     
 
On 16 January, the Cabinet of Ministers was due to give final approval to its 
privatization plan for 2008, which reportedly included putting 26 enterprises up 
for sale.  At the request of the presidential secretariat, however, the decision was 
postponed.  
 
The next day, President Yushchenko requested that six regional energy 
distribution companies—“oblenergos”—be excluded from the list.   To remove 
these companies from the oversight of the state Naftohaz gas company, his 
office said, may result in the “insolvency of that company.” (1) 
 
The president no doubt missed the irony of this criticism.   
 
The Naftohaz Insolvency 
Almost three weeks earlier, Tymoshenko’s team discovered that Naftohaz 
already was virtually bankrupt; its auditors, Ernst and Young, refused to sign off 
on its year-end accounts over worries that it would not survive as a “going 
concern.”  This refusal could have triggered a technical default, allowing 
international bond holders to call in repayment of all loans in full.  According to 
the government, approximately $2.6 billion could have been called in under 
default clauses, undercutting international trust in the country and further 
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burdening the already strained state budget.  Despite numerous red flags (Fitch, 
a leading international financial rating agency, placed long-term currency ratings 
on a negative watch in October), the president seemingly took no action.  (2) 
 
In its international newsletter, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (the Prime Minister’s 
parliamentary bloc) speculated that the Naftohaz situation was left “unresolved 
as a time-bomb for the incoming Orange government.” (3)  
 
The newsletter placed blame for the situation squarely on the shoulders of the 
outgoing government of Viktor Yanukovych – making no mention of President 
Yushchenko.  However, upon discovering the problem, the government acted 
alone to resolve it.  
 
Before taking office, incoming Vice Prime Minister for European Integration 
Hryhoriy Nemyria, Minister of Fuel and Energy Yuriy Prodan and Minister of 
Finance Viktor Pynzenyk met with bondholders to develop a plan to avoid 
default.  As a result, the newly reworked state budget for 2008 offered 
bondholders a State Sovereign Guarantee, with an available $400 million subsidy 
earmark for Naftohaz.  Thanks to the guarantee, Fitch analyst Anton Kravchenko 
said, “We are going to give them a little more time to produce the statements (of 
accounts).” (3)  
 
Oblenergo privatization and kompromat? 
Given the situation inside Naftohaz, the concern that privatization of oblenergos 
would damage the company’s solvency seems misguided.  In fact, the president 
himself recently altered course and suggested that his concern about this 
particular example of privatization actually is based on concerns about 
government corruption.  “I would not want the sale of an oblenergo to be 
connected with the shadowy ‘pocket’ agreements of a certain political power 
concerning distribution of these objects to specific people,” he told 1+1 television 
on 28 January. (4) 
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The clear implication, of course, is that Tymoshenko’s privatization plan is 
designed to transfer property from the state to her own backers.  The President 
further suggested that these companies could be given as bribes to members of 
parliament “so that they vote as somebody wishes.”   The head of state offered 
no specific details to support his stated concern.  “For now,” he said, “I only have 
this warning to make: I’m in the know. I have my grapevine.” (5)  
 
Ukraine’s media, which is free and regularly discusses corruption issues, has 
reported no evidence of such plans by the Tymoshenko government.     
 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko generally is viewed by the public as the country’s 
most radical fighter against corruption and is remembered for conducting 
Ukraine’s only open, transparent auction for a state asset during her first term as 
prime minister.  That public auction sold the Kryvorizhstal steel plant to Mittal 
Steel for $4.8 billion.      
 
The intimation of planned wrongdoing by Tymoshenko, however, is worrying for 
its lack of evidentiary support.  Of course, Ukraine’s public officials must be held 
accountable and checked carefully, particularly given the significant levels of 
corruption historically present throughout all state institutions.  But, just as the 
country must fight its history of corruption, so too must the use of unfounded 
criminal charges and claims against rivals be halted.  
 
Whether the charge was serious or simply meant to throw Tymoshenko off stride 
will become clear over time.  For now, the charge seems to have received little 
domestic attention.  However, it signals very difficult relations between the head 
of state and head of government, and could undermine the public’s already 
shaky faith in its leaders.  
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It also seems to be only the first of a potential large number of coming battles 
between the two leaders.  
 
What to do with RosUkrEnergo? 
Of most immediate concern is an apparent disagreement over how to deal with 
Ukraine’s reliance on the gas broker RosUkrEnergo (RUE), which is a joint 
venture of Gazprom and several Ukrainian individuals with ties to Ukraine’s 
political elite.  
 
Yushchenko opposes Tymoshenko’s plan to remove the intermediary from the 
country’s gas agreements with Russia immediately.  To do so, he says, would 
jeopardize the country’s below-market price agreed upon with Gazprom and RUE 
in December 2007.  “The price we have today, of 179 dollars per cubic meter,” he 
said on 20 January, “is the lowest price on the whole perimeter from the Baltic to 
the Caucasus.”  Moreover, “We have a rather low price for gas.  This is good.” (6)   
 
In contrast, for almost four years, Tymoshenko has railed against RosUkrEnergo, 
which controls the countries gas negotiations, as well as the system for importing 
gas from Russia and Turkmenistan.  She has criticized payments received by 
RUE that appear to raise costs for both Ukraine and Gazprom, and has 
suggested that unnamed politicians benefit financially from RUE’s involvement.  
“It is a front company, an artificially created company, so that gas coming to 
Ukraine comes through a filter that will catch a significant amount of money,” she 
told the New York Times in 2006. (7) 
 
It is worth noting that RUE reported earnings of around $800 million from its work 
as an intermediary during 2006. (8)  As of 28 January, earnings for 2007 do not 
appear on the company’s website. 
 
RUE also has been heavily criticized in Europe for the “very opaque” nature of 
the company. (9)  In response, just last week, during a visit to Brussels, 
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Tymoshenko once again pledged to remove all intermediaries from the gas 
industry and initiate direct gas agreements with Russia.  She also reiterated the 
government’s demand that the price paid by Russia for transit of gas through 
Ukraine to Europe be raised equally with the price paid by Ukraine for gas.  
 
This demand no doubt comes because Ukraine is now being charged much more 
for gas than stipulated in agreements approved by Yushchenko and then-Prime 
Minister Yanukovych in December 2007.  
 
Because Central Asia could not meet its designated gas volumes to Ukraine, 
RUE is making up the difference with Russian gas, for which it is charging not the 
$179 per cubic meter as promised, but $314 per cubic meter (pcm).  (10) Ukraine 
likely will be supplied with 2-4 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, billed at $314 
pcm in the next several months.  Already, Ukraine has developed a gas debt of 
over $800 million because of the increase in price – which was announced three 
days before President Yushchenko trumpeted the $179 pcm price as a reason to 
avoid asking for renegotiation of the country’s gas deal. (11) 
 
Furthermore, RUE’s domestic joint venture with Gazprom, UkrGazEnergo, was 
given the right to supply gas for two years to the best paying industrial 
consumers in Ukraine. This left the state gas company Naftohaz to supply and 
collect from the lowest paying residential consumers.  
 
Mismanagement and the loss of industrial customers are the primary reasons 
cited by experts for Naftohaz’s near default on its international bond agreements 
– and it shouldn’t be a surprise.  In January of 2006 on ICTV’s “Freedom of 
Speech,” then-opposition leader Tymoshenko debated allies of Yushchenko over 
the effect of allowing UkrGazEnergo to enter the gas distribution market in 
Ukraine.  She warned that the effect could be “bankruptcy and the loss of our 
state company.” (12) These worries were dismissed, as Yushchenko approved 
the deal.  
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Now, Naftohaz must be saved and the country must find a way to pay (or 
renegotiate) a price for gas to which it never agreed.   Therefore, the ability of 
Ukraine’s two most powerful politicians to come to an agreement regarding 
Ukraine’s strategy for negotiating with Russia over gas is a crucial test to their 
commitment to working for the country’s interests.  
 
So far, Tymoshenko has not responded to Yushchenko’s claims of potential 
corruption, and she has not criticized his position on RUE.  Unlike 2005, when 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko regularly entered into verbal sparring matches with 
Yushchenko and his allies, in 2008 she wisely has chosen to remain quiet – with 
one exception.  Last week she reminded the media of previous statements that 
she will run for president against Yushchenko in 2009 if the two cannot work 
harmoniously in government together.  
 
Nevertheless, both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko will travel to Moscow this 
month – separately.  They will hold separate meetings with separate press 
conferences, and they will either present a united or a divided front.  When both 
trips are over, it will be clear whether the two can work together to implement 
reforms, or whether the campaign for president has begun.     
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